PHENOMENOLOGY OF IMPUTATION IN CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE

Basing on the principle of primacy in cognition of reality of difference and differing, developed by modern analytical phenomenology (V. I. Molchanov), the author sets forth some initial statements identifying the outlines and borders, in which the criminal law imputation structure must be revealed. e conception of subjective imputation in its traditional form is reconsidered through the subject-objective dichotomy and converted into the several-phase system of juridical imputation, whose primary principle is the possibility to verify each attributing element of crime within the concrete phase of imputation.To reveal the necessity of improving the existing approaches to imputation problem, the author analyzes several examples from judicial practice. In the author’s opinion, wrong characterization of a death through negligence as an aggravated homicide is the judicial error, which is programmed by traditional paradigm of imputation. Such an error is determined by essential difficulties in verifying intent while using the abstract legislative definition of an objective side of crimes. e la er must be separated from its ontological ground – an intentional act, which is, even objectively considered, not equal to a negligence act in its objective sense. The author reveals the differences between the intentional act and negligence act and says that these differences don’t depend on the subjective side of both crimes. The possibility to verify intent and the necessity to assess objective blameworthiness as an objective correlation of the subjective side are narrowly connected and determined by each other. Therefore, it requires the primal highlighting of criminal relevant fact as an initial neutral object of legal analysis and assessment.