TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CONSIDERATIONS ON EFFICIENCY

The present work concludes the research initiated in the article «Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: introduction to the problem» (2024, no. 6, pp. 5–12) and continued in the article «Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: consolidation of the regime and establishment of the mechanism» (2025, no. 2, pp. 31–41). In this concluding study the author focuses on the declared and actual reasons for the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is emphasized that the 2017 Treaty is an attempt to give legally binding force of a universal nature to the political declarations of individual countries, despite the opposition of nuclear states. The issues of nuclear deterrence policy, the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the treaty capacity of the developers of the Treaty, and its objectives are examined separately in the context of the conclusion of the Treaty. The author concludes that the Treaty and the measures it proposes are ineffective and untimely, and that the established mechanisms of the regime are dysfunctional, with the declared goals being illusory and undermining trust both in nuclear disarmament efforts and in treaty negotiations in this area. The future of the 2017 Treaty appears bleak.