COLLISIONS BETWEEN INTERPRETATIVE ACTS OF COURTS AND POTENTIAL WAYS OF THEIR RESOLVING

The article is devoted to the potential ways of interpretative acts’ collisions. Firstly, to clarify a possibility of a collisions between interpretative acts the author draws attention to notions of an interpretative acts, an interpretative act of courts. Secondly, on the basis of concrete decisions and courts’ statistics the author analyses collision between the highest courts’ acts on the issue concerning so called retrospective clause. The issue concerns whether the retrospective clause is obligatory for review of decisions on the basis of new circumstances, to be more precisely on the basis of new positions of the highest courts. The author sees that legal theories including ways of collisions’ resolving do not answer a question concerning collisions between interpretative acts of courts. As a result, the author concludes that existing ways of collisions’ resolving (for example, lex posterior derogat priori) are not proper for collisions between interpretative acts of courts. These collisions should be decided with an essence of legal relationships and courts’ positions, their impact on participants’ legal rights and obligations.